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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jorgensen appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion
when it

his probation, or, alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua

sponte, when it did so.

part of his

requested the production of various

-:>nvu;:::,,c:,

transcripts, but the Idaho Supreme Court

his motion to augment the appellate

record with those transcripts. Mr. Jorgensen contends this constitutes a violation of his
state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result,
this Court should grant Mr. Jorgensen access

the requested transcripts and allow him

the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from
those transcripts.

of

In the event that request is denied, this Court should vacate the

district court's order revoking his probation and executing his sentence and remand this
case for a new disposition hearing.

Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Jorgensen's

sentence as it deems appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Jorgensen pied guilty to possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), which had been reduced from delivery of a
controlled substance.

(R., pp.47-49.)

The State agreed to recommend probation.

(R., pp.47-49.) The presentence investigator also recommended that Mr. Jorgensen be
placed on probation, as this was his first felony offense, he had been able to maintain
consistent employment, and he was willing to participate in treatment.
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3, 6, 8.)

(Presentence

The matter progressed to a

sentencing hearing, where the minutes indicate that Mr. Jorgensen had some concerns

1

about proceeding at that time. (R., p.72.) The minutes do not indicate how, or even
whether, those concerns were addressed. 1

generally

, pp.72-74.) Ultimately,

the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one and one-half years
fixed, which it suspended for a four-year period of probation. 2 (R., p.73.)
Approximately one year later, the State filed a report of probation violation.
(R., pp.95-96.)

Mr. Jorgensen admitted all but one of the alleged violations (which

the State subsequently dismissed).

(R., pp.100-02.)

The district court revoked

Mr. Jorgensen's probation, but retained jurisdiction, expecting that Mr. Jorgensen would
be able to participate in a rider program. (R., p. ·101.) When Mr. Jorgensen informed the
district court that

had spent 120 days waiting

transported to the rider facility,

the district court decided to return Mr. Jorgensen to probation. (R., p.112-15.)
Two years later, the State filed a second report of probation violation.
(R., pp.118-20.)

That report indicated that Mr. Jorgensen may have absconded

supervision. (R., pp.119.) Nevertheless, that report recommended that Mr. Jorgensen
only receive local incarceration with a treatment option.

(R., p.119.) An addendum

to that report was filed one year later, asserting that Mr. Jorgensen had, in fact,
absconded supervision, and changed the recommendation to a period of retained
jurisdiction.
violations.

(R., pp.129-30.)
(R., p.131.)

Mr. Jorgensen subsequently admitted the alleged

The district court entered a disposition conforming with the

Mr. Jorgensen requested a transcript of this hearing, as well as transcripts of various
other hearings which he believes are relevant to the issues on appeal. (See Motion to
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed
January 2, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion in regard to all but one
of the requested transcripts. (Order, filed January 22, 2013.)
2 While the judgment of conviction misstates the unified term of the sentence, it lists out
the same fixed and indeterminate periods as the oral pronouncement.
(See
R., pp.76 77; compare R., p.73.) The same error occurred when the district court
1

2

original recommendation, ordering that Mr. Jorgensen serve sixty days in local
incarceration, and it added four years to the period of probation. 3 (R., p.1
Several months later, a third report of probation violation was filed,

that

Mr. Jorgensen had absconded supervision again. (R., pp.135-36.) An addendum was
subsequently filed, but continued to recommend that the district court revoke
and execute the underlying sentence.

(R., pp.140-41.)

Mr. Jorgensen admitted the

new violations and the district court revoked his probation. (R., pp.142-45.) However,
the district court again retained jurisdiction over Mr. Jorgensen. (R., p.145.)
This time, Mr. Jorgensen was taken to the rider facility, where he
recommendation that
APSI), cover letter.)

be returned to probation.

(Addendum to

a

(hereinafter,

During his period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Jorgensen had

completed, or was anticipating completion of, ten different rehabilitation programs.
(APSI, p.1.) He had no formal disciplinary sanctions, and only two informal sanctions,
which occurred during the first few weeks he was in the program. (APSI, p.3; C-Notes
attached to APSI, pp.4-5.)
without a hearing.

The district court returned Mr. Jorgensen to probation

(R., pp.149-50.)

The terms of his new probation indicated that

Mr. Jorgensen had paid off all his outstanding fines and restitution. (R., p.152.)
Several months later, the State filed a fourth report of probation violation.

(R., pp.157-58.) Mr. Jorgensen admitted all but one of the allegations (which the State
ultimately withdrew).

(Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls. 7-10; Tr., Vol.2, p.5, Ls.12-18.) 4

Defense

revoked Mr. Jorgensen's probation. (See R., p.175.) However, the district court did
ultimately enter an amended order correcting that error. (R., p.177.)
3 Up to this point, the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson had been presiding on the case.
After this point, the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling took over and presided over the
remaining hearings. (See generally R.)
4 The transcripts that were provided in this case are contained in two independently
bound and paginated volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume
3

counsel filed a motion requesting the district court simply dismiss the

as

Mr. Jorgensen was only six months shy of completing the period of probation.
(R., p.166; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.17 - p.7, L.11.) The prosecutor agreed that Mr. Jorgensen's
period of probation would expire six months later, but opposed the motion to dismiss.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.1-'11 .)

Jorgensen also addressed the district court, stating

he was working to remain a productive member of society and that he did not present
an ongoing threat thereto.

, Vol.2, p.10, Ls.14-25.) He stated that his ultimate

is to reach the position where he can be a productive part of his daughter's life.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.1-3.)
The district court, however, considering the history Mr. Jorgensen had
absconding supervision and the type of violations that had been alleged, decided to
deny the motion to dismiss, revoke Mr. Jorgensen's probation, and execute the
underlying sentence. (R., p.173; Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.6 - p.12, L.2.) Mr. Jorgensen timely
appealed from that order {R., pp.179-81.)

containing the transcript of the admit-deny hearing held on August 1, 2012. "Vol.2" will
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the disposition hearing held on
September 6, 2012.
4

ISSUES

1

the Idaho
Court denied Mr. Jorgensen due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
for review of the
on appeal.
,Nhether the district court
its discretion when it revoked Mr. Jorgensen's
probation, or, alternatively, by not reducing his
sua sponte when it did
so.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Whether The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Jorgensen Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal

A

Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, according to the

United States Supreme Court, assures indigent defendants

they will not be denied

access to transcripts which are relevant to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So
long as the record reflects a colorable need for such a transcript, the courts may not
to provide that transcript unless the State proves that the transcript is not
relevant to an issue raised on appeal.
Mr. Jorgensen has raised a challenge to the decision to revoke his probation and
execute his sentence, or, alternatively, to not reduce his sentence sua sponte when it
did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be made part of the
appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts from
the change of plea hearing held on February 16, 2006, the sentencing hearing held on
March 27, 2006, the probation violation hearing held on March 19, 2006, the probation
violation hearing held on October 6, 2010, the probation violation hearing held on
August 31, 2011, the probation violation hearing held on October 6, 2011, and the
hearing on Mr. Jorgensen's motion for work release held on August 8, 2012.
As such, Mr. Jorgensen is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of
his request for these transcripts. Mr. Jorgensen asserts that the requested transcripts
are relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his
probation and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review
6

requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the
proceedings in order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions.

B.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Jorgensen With Access To The Requested
Transcripts, The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Jorgensen Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of
His Claims

The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; IDAH0 CONST. art I, § 13. Due process requires the defendant
given notice and a meaningful opportunity to

heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 1 ·1 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other

grounds by

v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that

judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham

City, 452 U.

18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have

been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of

Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute.

See

I. C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a);
I.C.R. 54.7(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction
and affects the defendant's substantial rights.

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right.

I.AR. 11 (c)(9);

State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established.

7

Its decisions have

established two fundamental themes.
protection clauses is broad.

First, the

of the due process and equal

disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not

tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review,
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials.
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).

In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial

court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that
time,

State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been

sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id.

14. The sole question before the United States Supreme

Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem. . .. Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."'

Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309

U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
8

poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative
exists. Id. at 20.
The United

-..r<O,TQC,

Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck

down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

See Bums v. Ohio, 360

U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held:
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.

Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible
destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at
258.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court addressed how courts should
go about determining whether defendants are entitled to certain transcripts.

Draper v. Washington,

372 U.S. 487 (1963).

See

First, the defendant must make

meritorious claims before transcripts will be provided at public expense. Id. at 494. The
Court clarified its statement in Griffin - that a stenographic transcript is not relevant if an
9

equivalent alternative is available.

Id. at 494-95.

"[P]art or all of the stenographic

transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id.
at 495.

The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the

defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately
concluded that the issues raised by those defendant could not be adequately reviewed
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
The United States Supreme Couti continued to expand the protections identified
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses.
U.S. 189 (1971 ).

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404

Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the

requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id, If
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary
for the appeal. Id.
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard.

See, e.g.,

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.

2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record.

10

The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Jorgensen Are Relevant To The Issues He
Has Raised On Appeal. Because The Appellate Courts Independently Review
The Entire Record Before The District Court VVhen Reviewing Decisions To
Revoke Probation And Execute The Underlying Sentence Without Reduction
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Jorgensen's claim that the
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed
to

uce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. "When we review a sentence that is
into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record

encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
original sentencing and the revocation of probation."

v. Hanington, 148 Idaho

a district court's determinations regarding a defendant's sentence conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports those
decisions. Id. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho
665, 666 (1984).
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an order revoking a
defendant's probation.

In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on

probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked his probation, although it
retained jurisdiction. Id. at 619-20. After the defendant completed his rider, the district
court placed the defendant back on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently
admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked that
probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the second order revoking probation. Id.
11

On appeal, the defendant in Morgan filed a motion to augment the appellate
with transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which
was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Id.

The defendant then challenged those

decisions on appeal, asserting they deprived him of due process and equal protection.
Id.

1. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation

proceedings were not necessary of the appeal because "they were not before the
district court in the second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during
those proceedings." 5

Id. at

1.

The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of

for a revocation determination:

5

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address the defendant's claim that the
Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the basis that it does not have
the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. However, the
Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed
motion to augment, which contained information or argument not presented to the Idaho
Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of Appeals after the case was assigned
P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.22, pp.3-4
to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, _
(Ct. App. April 11, 2013) (not yet final); State v. Thompson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion
No.439, p.3 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013) (not yet final). This position is untenable because
the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme
Court and expressly prohibit separate filings in the Court of Appeals:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment to the Court of Appeals, the title of the proceeding
and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed except that the
Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or other notations
to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the case. All case
filed shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
I.A.R. 110 (emphasis added). Furthermore, I.A.R. 30 requires all motions to augment
be filed with the Supreme Court:
12

[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to an including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (emphasis in original).

However, whether or not

transcripts of the requested proceedings were

before the district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is irrelevant in
regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal. In reaching a
decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not limited to considering
only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal is filed.

Rather, a

court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and
observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.

I.AR. 30 (emphasis added). Mr. Jorgensen is not aware of any court rule which allows
a party to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Since I.AR. 110 expressly
prohibits such filings, the Morgan Court's statement that the defendant could have filed
a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Idaho
Appellate Rules. Mr. Jorgensen recognizes that the facts in Morgan are similar to those
in his case, but, as articulated infra, he disagrees with that decision, which should be
overruled because it is directly contrary to the appellate rules.
Mr. Jorgensen is also aware that the Court of Appeals has recently rejected the
argument in regard to the applicability of the appellate rules. Cornelison, 2013 Opinion
No.22, pp.3-6. However, Cornelison is not yet final and Mr. Jorgensen also disagrees
with the holding in that case.
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State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 ( 1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge
in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v.
Wallace, 98 Idaho 318,

1 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon

"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"). In fact, the
Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only proper, but is actually expected
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
[the defendant] from the other case." State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App.
·1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed at the time of the revocation

hearing leading to the

is irrelevant because the district court may rely upon the

information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
sentencing decision after revoking probation.
The reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons.
First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision.
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts.
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.
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State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant
files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the
events which occurred during those proceedings.
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the
district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the Couti of
Appeals assumed the district court will automatically consider the prejudgment events
when determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation.
Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is irrelevant, as an
appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the events from the prior
proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.

It is true, in this case, that two different district court judges presided over
hearings.

The Honorable Gregory S. Anderson presided over the initial hearings,

including the change of plea hearing (R., pp.58-59), the original sentencing hearing
(R., pp.72-74), the hearing on Mr. Jorgensen's Rule 35 motion (R., pp.87-88), the
disposition hearing on the first report of probation violation (R., pp.100-02), and the rider
review hearing (R., pp.112-13). The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling presided over the
remaining hearings, which included the disposition hearing on the second report of
probation violation (R., pp.131-32), the disposition hearing on the third report of
15

probation violation (R., pp.144-45), and the disposition hearing on the fourth report of
probation violation (R., pp.171-72), from which Mr. Jorgensen appeals.

As a result,

Mr. Jorgensen should at least have been afforded the transcripts from the hearings over
which Judge Shindurling presided, since it is from one of Judge Shindurling's decisions
that Mr. Jorgensen has appealed.

Downing, 1

Idaho at 373-74; Adams, 115

Idaho at 1055-56; see also Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Gibson,
106 Idaho at 495.
However, the Court of Appeals' second rationale for appellate review of the entire
record means that Mr. Jorgensen should have also received transcripts of the hearings
presided over by Judge Anderson:
[W]hen a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant
has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is
later revoked, and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue
of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to
adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not
made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. The Adams Court made it clear that challenges to the

excessiveness of the sentence should not be filed until the sentence is actually
executed. Id. Therefore, in order to be sufficient for appellate review, the record needs
to contain all the transcripts relating to the scope of the sentence, which includes the
initial imposition of sentence, because they are relevant to that issue properly on
appeal.

Additionally,

since

the

district

court

could

have

properly

reduced

Mr. Jorgensen's sentence at any of the hearings where it revoked his probation, see
State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008), all the subsequent hearings are also

relevant, and transcripts thereof are also necessary to the appellate record. As such, all
16

the transcripts that addressed the initial sentence or the decisions thereafter are
relevant to the
review. See,

raised on appeal and should

provided to allow for sufficient

Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56.

Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Jorgensen access to those transcripts
constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, e.g., Mayer,
404 U.

at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a verbatim transcript

was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the courts improperly
foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent defendants access to
such transcripts.

Lane v. Brown,

U.

480-85 (1963).

Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid

The United

. to prevent an indigent

from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant
must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural default:

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court."6 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing

If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that]
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review,
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection.
In this case, the minutes only indicate whether some person was addressing the
district court, not the contents of their statements. The contents of those statements,
particularly the defendant's statements of allocution, are relevant to the excessive
sentence claim. See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003). The
6
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v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,

(Ct. App. ·1996); State v. Repici, 1

Idaho 538, 541

(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. ·1985). Therefore, if Mr. Jorgensen fails to provide the
appellate court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal
presumption will apply and Mr. Jorgensen's claims regarding the excessiveness of his
sentence will not be addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of
the Idaho Supreme Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive
him of an effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process
and equal protection grounds.

Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85.

Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that
situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what occurred
at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision
to revoke probation. When Mr. Jorgensen was first placed on probation and given the

missing transcripts in this case would contain such statements. (See, e.g., R., p.72
(Mr. Jorgensen making a statement, potentially of allocution, at the initial sentencing
hearing); R., p.101 (Mr. Jorgensen offering testimony regarding the alleged probation
violations, potentially offering explanation or mitigation in that regard); R., pp.131-32
(same); R., pp.142-43 (same); R., p.144 (Mr. Jorgensen making a statement, potentially
of allocution, at a disposition hearing); R., p.164 (defense counsel arguing specific
mitigation in regard to Mr. Jorgensen's application to the problem-solving courts).
Therefore, the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these statements, are
insufficient in this case to provide for adequate review.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the minutes of the sentencing
hearing reflect that Mr. Jorgensen had some concerns about proceeding with the
sentencing hearing, but they do not indicate what those concerns were or how, if ever,
they were allayed. (R., p.72.) Since this is the proper stage at which to raise
challenges to the sentencing decisions, see, e.g., Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56, that
transcript, at least, was necessary so that the hearing could be properly and effectively
reviewed. This further demonstrates that the minutes are insufficient in this case to
protect Mr. Jorgensen's due process and equal protection rights.
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opportunity for multiple periods of probation
found,

the district court must have

subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give

Mr. Jorgensen the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society.
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, by placing Mr. Jorgensen

on probation on each of those prior occasions, the district court must have determined
that the mitigating factors presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented.
I.C. § 1

1; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.

such, to presume that the missing

transcripts of those hearings supports the decision to relinquish jurisdiction ignores the
mitigating factors that were present
view of IVlr. Jorgensen.

those hearings and presents a negative, one-

As a result, the denial of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented Mr. Jorgensen from addressing those positive factors in
support of his appellate claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Jorgensen argues that the
events which occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be presumed to
invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As
such, the decision to deny Mr. Jorgensen's request for the necessary transcripts will
render his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the
19

missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a
procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Jorgensen's sentencing claims on the
merits and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Jorgensen's request for those transcripts
was denied, that presumption means that

district court's sentencing decisions

should be reversed.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Jorgensen With Access To The Requested
Transcripts, The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because
He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

D.

The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny,
determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)).

As

such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on
appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments
to be made.

See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

The

constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.;
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see also Banuelos v. State, 1

Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this

the lack

access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Jorgensen
has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on

merits of his

claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for
evaluating whether counsel

effective assistance in a criminal action is

American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 1

121 Idaho 425.

(1989) overruled on other grounds by Card,

These standards offer insight into the role and responsibilities of

appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to

advise Mr. Jorgensen on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal.
Mr. Jorgensen is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
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transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. ,Jorgensen his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include the right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Jorgensen's Probation,
Or, Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte When It Did So

A

Introduction
The record in this case indicates that, given a sufficient consideration of the

relevant factors, Mr. Jorgensen remained an acceptable candidate for probation. As
such, the district court's decision to revoke his probation constituted an abuse of
discretion. Alternatively, Mr. Jorgensen's sentence should have been reduced when the
district court revoked his probation.

Therefore, because the district court abused its

discretion, this Court should reverse the district court's order revoking probation and
remand for a new disposition hearing, or, alternatively, reduce Mr. Jorgensen's
sentence as it deems appropriate.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Jorgensen's Probation
Mr. Jorgensen asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke

probation and execute his unified sentences of ten years, with four years fixed, was an
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is within the
district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The
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district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society.

Id.

In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered

inquiry, determining "( 1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
whether the

court acted within the boundaries of such discretion

with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and

and

(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989)).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard
are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally;
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects

society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.;
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of

society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id.

Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more

lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90
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(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct.

1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301

(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

These same factors are

appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation.

See

State v. Sanchez, ·149 Idaho 102, ·106-07 (2009).

In this

several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently

considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Jorgensen.
As a result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Jorgensen's probation was
adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from
Mr. Jorgensen through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 31

Therefore, this

disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Mr. Jorgensen remained a good candidate for probation, though potentially in a
more active supervision situation (such as some form of inpatient treatment program).
Mr. Jorgensen told the district court he was trying to comply with the terms of his
probation, and all the reported violations reveal is that he is human and fell short of his
goals. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Jorgensen told the district court that he
hoped to reach a situation where he could re-enter his daughter's life. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11,
Ls.1-3.)

And, to that point, Mr. Jorgensen has demonstrated that he is capable of

succeeding in rehabilitative programs.

(See APSI, p.1 (noting that Mr. Jorgensen

completed

programs

ten

different rehabilitative

during

his

period

of retained

jurisdiction).) He had, even before his most recent period of probation, paid off all his
fines and restitution. (R., p.152.)
Additionally, Mr. Jorgensen was only six months away from completing his period
of probation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.11; Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.9-10.)
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Additionally, the

underlying charge was Mr. Jorgensen's first felony charge. (PSI, pp.2-3.) The Idaho
Supreme Court

treatment

than

"recognized that the first offender should
the

habitual

criminal."

(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho

Shideler,

accorded more lenient
103

Idaho

595,

(1953), overruled on other grounds by
·1 )). This is because such a person

228 (1

not

yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this point is more likely.
Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Additionally, Mr. Jorgensen possesses employable skills, as

well as the ability to maintain consistent employment. (PSI, p.6.) These two factors
also indicate that he is not a continuing threat to society, but able to be a productive
of society.

Tr., Vol.2, p.10,

14-25.) As such, the decision to revoke

probation constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. See Merwin, 131 Idaho
at 648; l.C. § 19-2521.

C.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion Revoking Probation
Without Reducing Mr. Jorgensen's Sentence Sua Sponte When It Did So
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Jorgensen's

probation, it did abuse its discretion by not reducing Mr. Jorgensen's sentence pursuant
to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides to resume the execution of the
underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce
the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782.
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. Hanington, 148 Idaho
at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are the same
as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 (identifying
the factors to be considered at sentencing).
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Therefore, the district court needed to

sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 1
result in a more lenient sentence.

Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should

e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103

Idaho at 595.
For

same reasons the district court's

its discretion

Section 11(8), supra) the d

of probation was an abuse of
court's decision to not reduce

Mr. Jorgensen's sentence sua sponte upon the revocation of probation constituted an
abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied,

Mr. Jorgensen

respectfully requests this Court vacate the order revoking his probation and executing
his sentence and remand this case for a new disposition hearing.

Alternatively, he

respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this

ih day of May, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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